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Abstract
This paper describes the Speech Technology Center (STC) anti-
spoofing systems submitted to the ASVspoof 2019 challenge
1. The ASVspoof2019 is the extended version of the previous
challenges and includes 2 evaluation conditions: logical access
use-case scenario with speech synthesis and voice conversion
attack types and physical access use-case scenario with replay
attacks. During the challenge we developed anti-spoofing so-
lutions for both scenarios. The proposed systems are imple-
mented using deep learning approach and are based on differ-
ent types of acoustic features. We enhanced Light CNN archi-
tecture previously considered by the authors for replay attacks
detection and which performed high spoofing detection qual-
ity during the ASVspoof2017 challenge. In particular here we
investigate the efficiency of angular margin based softmax ac-
tivation for training robust deep Light CNN classifier to solve
the mentioned-above tasks. Submitted systems achieved EER
of 1.86% in logical access scenario and 0.54% in physical ac-
cess scenario on the evaluation part of the Challenge corpora.
High performance obtained for the unknown types of spoof-
ing attacks demonstrates the stability of the offered approach
in both evaluation conditions.
Index Terms: spoofing, anti-spoofing, speaker recognition, re-
play attack, speech synthesis, voice conversion, ASVspoof2019
1. Introduction
Over the past few years, voice biometric technologies have
reached impressive performance, which can be confirmed by
the results of the NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation (SRE)
Challenges [1]. Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) systems
are already used in security systems of socially significant in-
stitutions, in immigration control, forensic laboratories and for
identity verification in Internet banking, and other electronic
commerce systems.
Alongside the increasing performance and increasing con-
fidence in speaker recognition methods, the privacy level of the
information with the necessity to protect it also increases. This
leads to higher requirements for the reliability of the biomet-
ric systems including their robustness against malicious attacks.
Active fraudster attempts to falsify voice characteristics in or-
der to gain unauthorised access referred to as spoofing attacks
or presentation attacks (ISO/IEC 30107-1) are the biggest threat
for voice biometric systems. The widespread use of ASV sys-
tems and new approaches in machine learning has forced the
significant quality improvement of these attacks. Many studies
1This work was partially financially supported by the Government
of the Russian Federation (Grant 08-08).
show that despite the high performance of the state-of-the-art
ASV systems they are still vulnerable and the need in reliable
spoofing detection methods for ASV systems is apparent.
Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Countermea-
sures initiative (ASVspoof) has attracted the high interest of the
research community to the task of unforeseen spoofing trials
detection. It has significantly pushed forward the development
of spoofing detection methods by organizing ASVspoof Chal-
lenges in 2015 and 2017, that were aimed to develop counter-
measures to detect speech synthesis with voice conversion at-
tacks and replay attacks, respectively.
In 2019, the competition was held for the third time and
was the extended version of the previous ones [2]. The task was
to design the generalised countermeasures in 2 evaluation con-
ditions: logical access use-case scenario with speech synthesis
and voice conversion attack types and physical access use-case
scenario with replay attacks.
For both scenarios, we proposed several systems based on
the enhanced Light CNN architecture, considered by the authors
for replay attacks detection in [3] and outperformed other pro-
posed systems during ASVspoof2017 challenge. The proposed
systems are based on different types of acoustic features.
This paper explores angular margin based softmax and
batch normalization techniques for anti-spoofing systems qual-
ity improvements.
Section 2 describes the proposed modifications of the orig-
inal LCNN-system for spoofing detection from [3] in details.
Section 3.3 contains the overview of all proposed single and
submitted systems, while in section ?? the results obtained for
these systems on the development and evaluation parts are pre-
sented and analysed.
It is worth mentioning that according to the evaluation plan
all data used for training and evaluation was modelled using
acoustic replay simulation. On the one hand, this helps to care-
fully control acoustic and replay configurations, but on the other
hand, results raise some doubts about the usability of the con-
sidered systems for real-case scenarios. According to our ex-
periments performed for spoofing attacks in real and emulated
telephone channel [4] systems trained for emulated conditions
cannot detect spoofing attacks in real cases.
2. LCNN system modifications
All of the proposed systems for both scenarios were based on
the enhanced Light CNN architecture previously used for re-
play attack detection [3]. The specific characteristic of Light
CNN architecture [5] is the usage of the Max-Feature-Map ac-
tivation (MFM) which is based on Max-Out activation function
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[?]. Neural network with MFM is capable to choosing fea-
tures which are essential for task solving. According to im-
pressive results obtained by the authors in [3] for replay attacks,
such type of networks can be successfully implemented for anti-
spoofing.
2.1. Front-End
We explored several types of acoustic features as input for
LCNN, all of them were used in a raw format.
Our experience in spoofing detection confirms that power
spectrum contains useful information related to the speech sig-
nal and artifacts specific to different spoofing attacks and can
be used as informative time-frequency representation for spoof-
ing detection task. We used raw log power magnitude spec-
trum computed from the signal as features. For this purpose,
the spectrum was extracted via:
• constant Q transform (CQT) [6]
• Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
• Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
Additionally, we considered cepstral coefficients
from baseline systems, proposed by the organisers of the
ASVspoof2019: Linear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(LFCC) [7] obtained by the use of triangular filters in linear
space for local integration of the power spectrum and Constant
Q Cepstral Coefficients based on the geometrically spaced
filters [6] .We explored efficiency of using simple enegry based
Speech Activity Detector (SAD) for solving spoofing detection
task for both PA and LA attack types.
2.2. LCNN classifier
In contrast to our LCNN system presented in [3] for replay at-
tacks detection, the proposed systems are used not as high-level
features extractor, followed by GMM scoring model. Instead of
that LCNN was used here for final score estimation based on
the low-level acoustic features.
Additional steps of batch normalization were also used after
MaxPooling layers to increase stability and convergence speed
during the training process. The detailed architecture is de-
scribed in Table 1.
2.3. Angular margin based softmax activation
The key difference of the novel LCNN system is angular margin
based softmax loss (A-softmax) used for training the described
architecture. A-softmax was introduced in [8] and demonstrated
an elegant way to obtain well-regularized loss function by forc-
ing learned features to be discriminative on a hypersphere man-
ifold. Thus angular margin softmax loss can be described as:
Lang =
1
N
∑
i− log
(
e‖xi‖ cos (mθi,yi )
e‖xi‖ cos (mθi,yi ) +
∑
i6=yi e
‖xi‖ cos (mθi,yi )
)
(1)
where N is the number of training samples {xi}Ni=1 and
their labels {yi}Ni=1, θi,yi is the angle between xi and the cor-
responding column yi of the fully connected classification layer
weights W , and m is an integer that controls the size of an an-
gular margin between classes.
This approach has already used in [9] for high-level speaker
embedding extractor. The learned features are constrained to a
unit hypersphere. Such regularization technique also addresses
Table 1: LCNN architecture
Type Filter / Stride Output Params
Conv 1 5× 5 / 1× 1 863× 600× 64 1.6K
MFM 2 − 864× 600× 32 −
MaxPool 3 2× 2 / 2× 2 431× 300× 32 −
Conv 4 1× 1 / 1× 1 431× 300× 64 2.1K
MFM 5 − 431× 300× 32 −
BatchNorm 6 − 431× 300× 32 −
Conv 7 3× 3 / 1× 1 431× 300× 96 27.7K
MFM 8 − 431× 300× 48 −
MaxPool 9 2× 2 / 2× 2 215× 150× 48 −
BatchNorm 10 − 215× 150× 48 −
Conv 11 1× 1 / 1× 1 215× 150× 96 4.7K
MFM 12 − 215× 150× 48 −
BatchNorm 13 − 215× 150× 48 −
Conv 14 3× 3 / 1× 1 215× 150× 128 55.4K
MFM 15 − 215× 150× 64 −
MaxPool 16 2× 2 / 2× 2 107× 75× 64 −
Conv 17 1× 1 / 1× 1 107× 75× 128 8.3K
MFM 18 − 107× 75× 64 −
BatchNorm 19 − 107× 75× 64 −
Conv 20 3× 3 / 1× 1 107× 75× 64 36.9K
MFM 21 − 107× 75× 32 −
BatchNorm 22 − 107× 75× 32 −
Conv 23 1× 1 / 1× 1 107× 75× 64 2.1K
MFM 24 − 107× 75× 32 −
BatchNorm 25 − 107× 75× 32 −
Conv 26 3× 3 / 1× 1 107× 75× 64 18.5K
MFM 27 − 107× 75× 32 −
MaxPool 28 2× 2 / 2× 2 53× 37× 32 −
FC 29 − 160 10.2 MM
MFM 30 − 80 −
BatchNorm 31 − 80 −
FC 32 − 2 64
Total − − 371K
the problem of overfitting by separating classes in cosine simi-
larity metric.
We use A-softmax as an effective discriminative objective
for training our model.
LCNN weights were initialized using normal Kaiming ini-
tialization. And dropout 0.75 was used to reduce overfitting.
3. Experimental setup
3.1. Datasets
All experiments presented further were conducted on
ASVspoof 2019 datasets. The detailed description of these
datasets can be found in [2]. To train all the systems we used
only the train part. The dev part was used for performance
validation and weights adjustment for system fusion. The
evaluation part includes a set of unseen genuine verification
trials and spoofing attacks, generated with unknown spoofing
algorithms and replay configurations which differ from those
in the train and development parts.
3.2. Details of systems implementation
We prepared several single systems for each scenario, based on
the features described above and LCNN architecture from 1.
Figure 1: Scores distributions for LA and PA systems for genuine and spoofing samples respectively.
For logical access scenario we used the following configura-
tions:
• LFCC-LCNN: LFCC were extracted similar to baseline
system with 20 ms window length, 512 number of FFT
bins and 20 filters.
• LFCC-CMVN-LCNN: This system is similar to previ-
ous one. The only difference is that LFCC features were
normalized by mean and variance.
• CQT-LCNN: CQT spectrum was extracted with the use
of the default settings from baseline CQCC based sys-
tem: 96 bins per octave, 1724 window size and 0.0081
step.
• FFT-LCNN: FFT spectrum was extracted with 1724
window length and step 0.0081, the Blackman window
function was used.
For physical access scenario we used the following configura-
tions:
• LFCC-LCNN: similar to LFCC-LCNN for LA scenario
• CQT-LCNN: similar to CQT-LCNN for LA scenario
• DCT-LCNN: For DCT spectrum the 863 window length
and 0.0081 step were used.
Only the first 600 features for each file were used as LCNN
input in all single systems. No additionally preprocessing tech-
niques such as speech activity detection or dereverberation was
explored in these systems.
3.3. Submission systems
The primary systems submitted to the challenge were the fusion
of the single systems on the score level. Fusion of the subsys-
tems scores was done with equal weights. Before fusion scores
were normalized by the standard deviation of the genuine class
distribution for each single system. The reason for that was the
Gaussian distribution of genuine scores in contrast to spoofing
scores, (see Figure 1 for LA and PA systems scores distribu-
tions).
4. Results and Discussion
The results for our single and fusion systems are presented in
terms of Equal Error Rate (EER) and minimum tandem detec-
tion cost function (min-tDCF) used as the primary metric in the
Challenge.
Results obtained on the development and evaluation sets of
the ASVspoof2019 dataset confirm the efficiency of deep learn-
ing approaches for the ASV spoofing detection tasks considered
in the ASVSpoof2019.
Results of the preliminary investigations of the baseline
systems [2], presented in Table 2, demonstrate that the use of
Figure 2: EER during training process for PA CQT-LCNN sys-
tem (top) and LA FFT-LCNN system (bottom)
SAD leads to the quality reduction in terms of EER and min-
tDCF for LFCC and CQCC based systems in both LA and
PA scenarios. The possible reason for this is that nonspeech
and boundary regions contain discriminative features and dis-
tortions specific to various types of spoofing or genuine speech
in the opposite. For example, constant energy values in concrete
frequency regions, specific to some microphones or recording
systems. For this reason, we decided to exclude SAD from the
systems we used in the Challenge.
Curious, that cepstral mean and variance (cmvn) features
normalisation didn’t provide an expected quality improvement
on the development set (See Table 2). This behaviour dif-
fers from the earlier experiments on ASVspoof2015 [10] and
ASVspoof2017 [11] datasets, that did not contain artificially
produced data. [12]. Taking into account our experience in
spoofing detection in unforeseen conditions we assume that
cmvn can increase the robustness of our systems against un-
known attacks from the evaluation set. However, according to
results, of our single systems on the development and evaluation
systems in Table 3, we see the opposite. Such results reinforce
our concerns about modelled data and real case mismatch.
Experiment results for deep learning based systems, pro-
posed in the current paper, prove that implementation of angu-
Figure 3: Performance of the primary PA system pooled by PA spoofing attack types from the evaluation set. Da relates to distance to a
talker at which the replay attack is recorded, Q reletes to loudspeaker quality, S,R,Ds relates to (room size, reverberation and talker
to ASv system distance)
Table 2: Performance of baseline systems and their modifica-
tions
LA PA
System EER min-tDCF EER min-tDCF
LFCC-GMM 3.029 0.078 11.226 0.241
LFCC-CMVN-GMM 6.000 0.153 16.686 0.345
LFCC-VAD-GMM 7.181 0.185 15.503 0.337
CQCC-GMM 0.473 0.014 10.072 0.194
CQCC-CMVN-GMM 3.095 0.086 13.000 0.267
CQCC-VAD-GMM 3.571 0.108 10.144 0.204
lar margin based softmax loss as classifier layer for spoofing
detection system training allows to improve system quality and
stabilize training process (see Figure 2) for both LA and PA
scenarios.
Experiments, conducted on the development part of
ASVspoof2019 corpora, confirm that batch normalization and
angular margin based softmax activation improve the perfor-
mance of the original LCNN system for different types of low-
level acoustic features in both scenarios (Figure 2).
Table 3 and Table 4 present the performance of all sin-
gle systems proposed for LA and PA respectively. High per-
formance obtained for the unknown types of spoofing attacks
performed on the evaluation part of ASVspoof2019 corpora
demonstrates the stability of the offered approach in both eval-
uation conditions.
Figure 4: Performance of the primary LA system pooled by LA
spoofing attack types from the evaluation set
Detailed analysis of our LA final system quality for dif-
ferent types of logical attacks, that are presented in Figure 4
demonstrates that it degrades in case of some unknown types of
spoofing attacks (A10-A15, A17-A18) [2]. The most difficult
spoofing attack to detect for our system was A17 (voice conver-
sion with waveform filtering) task for our system.
Figure 3 illustrates the analysis of PA detection perfor-
mance depended on the replay attack configuration: replay de-
vice quality, distances to the talker and to ASV system and re-
verberation characteristics. It can be concluded that replay at-
tack detection performance depends on the replay attacks qual-
ity. The most high-quality attacks replay sessions recorded at a
small distance to talker with the use of high-quality loudspeaker.
Table 3: Results for submitted LA systems
dev eval
System min-tDCF EER min-tDCF EER
LFCC-LCNN 0.0043 0.157 0.1000 5.06
LFCC-CMVN-LCNN 0.0370 1.174 0.1827 7.86
CQT-LCNN 0.0000 0.000 - -
FFT-LCNN 0.0009 0.040 0.1028 4.53
baseline LFCC 2.7060 0.069 0.2120 8.09
Fusion 0.0000 0.000 0.0510 1.84
Table 4: Results for submitted PA systems
dev eval
System min-tDCF EER min-tDCF EER
CQT-LCNN 0.0197 0.800 0.0295 1.23
LFCC-LCNN 0.0320 1.311 0.1053 4.60
DCT-LCNN 0.0732 3.850 0.560 2.06
Fusion 0.0001 0.0154 0.0122 0.54
5. Conclusion
This paper describes STC systems submitted to the
ASVspoof2019 Challenge for LA and PA evaluation con-
ditions. The main difference from the previous ASVspoof
challenges is that all data used for training and evaluation was
modelled using acoustic replay simulation. In our opinion,
this deals with some restrictions from the practical point of
view. According to the results obtained on the evaluation part
of ASVspoof2019 corpora, the proposed LCNN based systems
perform well in both PA and LA cases. Submitted systems
achieved EER of 1.86% in LA scenario and 0.54% in PA
scenario for unknown types of attacks.
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